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Abstract: An empirical application of abstract network analysis software
is presented in this paper. Environmental policy networks are used as a case
study. The visualization of the real network hierarchy and activity (formal
and informal) is feasible only by using special software. A system of "actors"
(e.g. public institutions, interest groups, enterprises) interacting with each
other and dealing with a particular environmental issue constitutes a policy
network, which inﬂuences the environmental policy functionality. The impacts
of policy content ambiguity on network characteristics have been analyzed by
using network analysis software as an example of combining algorithms with
empiricism. Recommendations are made to software engineers about possible
combination of algorithms with statistics and enrichment of the network anal-
ysis software with more visual analytic functions. Stronger familiarization of
software engineers with policy analysis discourse and of policy analysts with
positivism becomes more imperative for this purpose. On the basis of the
quantitative results, environmental policy-makers are advised to invest more
in trust development than in pressure and to instrumentalize more scientiﬁc
information under conditions of ambiguity.
Keywords: Environmental Policy, Rural Development, Ambiguity, Network
Analysis Software, Network Density.
1 Introduction
1.1 Aims and orientation
This research is presenting the results of an application of the software VISONE [3,4] in the
analysis and visualization of hierarchies and policy impacts.
The software alone is not able to be useful for analyzing practical policy issues, if the links of
the network are not well deﬁned and functionalized. This paper will show in details how software
of social network analysis can be integrated into theoretical frameworks of policy analysis and in
general will point out the importance of implementing software in the classical policy research in
order to visualize and analyze the formal and informal hierarchies developed in policy making.
The software engineers will improve the functionality of the software they develop, if they achieve
to integrate it into the empirical implementation. For this purpose, they should cooperate with
positivist social scientists and policy researchers.
The cases presented in this paper concern the impacts of legal acts which are characterized by
ambiguous formulation. This paper is expected to interest policy makers and policy addressees
(like associations of forest and land owners, environmental groups, enterprises, public agencies),
as it provides information about obstacles they are going to confront with during their involve-
ment in ambiguous environmental policy issues. Suggestions will be made for the improvement
of their strategy.
Copyright c 2006-2011 by CCC Publications
Network Analysis Functionality in Environmental Policy: Combining Abstract Software
Engineering with Field Empiricism 623
Basic features of the networks will also be presented. Methodological and theoretical points
will be discussed.
1.2 Literature review
The need of abstracting social phenomena in a form of algorithm-based ontology has already
been pointed out on numerous research occasions [1, 2, 5, 6, 16]. Such an abstract approach is
a software tool for social network analysis. It is based on Matrix Algebra and can serve as an
interdisciplinary tool for in-depth comparative exploration of diﬀerent policy ﬁelds and issue
networks in quantitative terms. In other words, it is a functionalization of the System Theory
in the analysis of policy ﬁelds [7–11, 32]. Through such a tool, the knowledge can be accessible
for various learning communities [15, 17, 23, 25–30]. However, an appropriate functionalization
of the links of a network on an empirical basis is necessary. Otherwise, the abstract tool will
remain interesting only for mathematicians or software engineers and it will not be applicable
on particular policy ﬁelds.
The necessity for cooperation between software engineers and experts of particular ﬁelds,
in order to integrate applicable algorithms in the software, has been acknowledged [19–21, 33].
However, such joint projects could be many more than they are until now.
A policy network is a system of relations (exchange of information, trust, pressure) between
actors (interest groups, enterprises and agencies), which deal with a particular policy issue (e.g.
the certiﬁcation of forestry sustainability in Denmark). What keep them together are the power
relations between the actors [8,13] and of course the hope of everyone -even of the weak ones- to
gain something from their networking. The power is nothing but the ability of someone to get
someone else doing something, even if this may be unpleasant for the latter. The political power
can be distinguished in two main dimensions: a) trust and b) pressure. Pressure may be oﬃcial
or unoﬃcial and is based on the institutional dependence which may be created in transparent
or intransparent framework.
The dependence on material support is a weak dimension in the networks discussed in this
paper [34], it presented no substantial correlation and will not be extensively examined on this
occasion.
Trust usually causes the longest-term eﬀects because it assures legitimization to the trustee-
actor and keeps the behaviour of the trustor under control even when the trustee-actor is absent
and cannot supervise the trustor (e.g. the client follows the advice of the attorney even outside
his oﬃce). It is understandable that the power - more precisely its unequal distribution- builds
formal and informal hierarchies in a network.
The sharper the oligarchy is within the network, the fewer the conﬂicts are, because normally
none starts a conﬂict, when it is evident who is going to win. Under these conditions, the
network is supposed to become more sustainable [24]. However, our results allow us discussing
this hypothesis more critically; It is going to be shown that though high legal ambiguity decreases
oligarchy and thus lets conﬂicts proliferate, the network is not dissolved. In contrast, the contacts
between the actors proliferate and the more policy sectors are integrated within the network (e.g.
tourism, forestry, agriculture, industry, urbanization and new relationship between urban and
rural areas etc).
Another usual hypothesis which is here critically examined is that the trust between the
actors is restricted, when the cross-sectorality of the network increases and the contacts between
the actors proliferate [13, 16, 31]. Our ﬁnding supports that though sectors and contacts prolif-
erate under conditions of high legal ambiguity, the trust relations also proliferate and are not
deconstructed. In contrast, the relations based on pressure seem to be deconstructed.
It has been found that the use of general information (political arguments) is avoided as a
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mean of over-bridging sectors in networks which are characterized by high legal ambiguity ("low
formalization degree") [12–14]. The hypothesis supported by our ﬁndings is that in case of high
legal ambiguity the scientiﬁc information is more intensively used than the general one.
The ﬁndings will also support the hypothesis that the more non-regulative instruments
(namely informative or ﬁnancial means) are included in environmental policy content, the more
ambiguous this content becomes [14].
1.3 Paper’s Innovation
Even a software like VISONE which has been tested and proven to be appropriate for social
network analysis, cannot be useful, if it is not integrated in an appropriate ﬁeld-related theoretical
and empirical framework. In this paper, the software VISONE is applied to forest environment
policy networks by using Theory of Organized Interests. The "new relationship" between urban
and rural areas can also be depicted on the interactions between interest groups and public
institutions. The examination of the real (or not) "partnership" character of this relationship as
provided by the European Spatial Development Perspective is also enabled.
It is an example of supporting abstract software with concrete empirical concepts. The results
can be used as a feedback to software engineers as well as to policy analysts and power theorists
(how network analysis software can be used for understanding policy arena hierarchies and their
interaction with characteristics of policy content such as ambiguity). The innovation lies in the
combination of empiricism and abstract software (Fig. 1).
Figure 1: Supporting abstract software engineering with ﬁeld research empiricism
2 The Empirical Basis
2.1 Design of the empirical research
Based on concepts of Policy Analysis such as power (trust and pressure), information, am-
biguity, real policy networks are opened up in various countries and an empirical database is
created. Then, the data are processed through VISONE software and statistics software SPSS
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considering concepts of Policy Analysis. Qualitative interviews serve as a corrective tool during
the theoretical concept building and the interpretation or the quantitative ﬁndings (Fig. 1).
The data were selected from 12 networks of environmental policy throughout 8 countries of
the European Union (they will be described below). Standardized questionnaires were used. The
interviewees were chairpersons, general secretaries, lobbyists or managing directors of the actors.
The ﬁrst actor was randomly selected from a speciﬁc list and asked to mention an environmental
issue (e.g. certiﬁcation of sustainability in forestry), in which he was involved in the last two
years and thought that he managed to be "successful". Then, he was asked to mention the actors
with whom he came in contact, within the frame of the particular issue. Next, it was asked from
these actors to report those actors that they came in contact with, within the frame of the same
issue, as well, and so on. Through this snowball sampling, the whole network was structured step
by step till it stopped getting expanded. This is the method of the complete network analysis.
Then, it can be turned into a matrix and be processed algebraically and statistically. By using
Matrix Algebra, it is possible to retrace the ﬂow of information, of trust and of the pressure, and,
thus, to ﬁnd the individuals that can control most of the actors, revealing the true hierarchies
(formal or informal).
The variables of VISONE were processed through cross-sectional analysis (Pearson test) at
signiﬁcance level of 5% after normality test. Pearson test is more ﬂexible and functional, as
it oﬀers a clearer overview of correlations among variables, in contrast to other tests such as
multivariate regression which may become more rigid and restrictive regarding variable relations.
The network sampling which is applied is by deﬁnition a non-random sample. However, this is
no methodological weakness as long as only analytic statistics (correlations between variables)
is conducted and no generalization of descriptive statistical results (e.g. mean, variance) on a
larger population is aimed. Qualitative interviews with ﬁeld experts (lobbyists, directors etc)
have conﬁrmed the reliability of the quantitative results and help a deeper understanding of their
perception and their causal relations, as will be discussed below (Section 3).
2.2 Functionality & Variables
At ﬁrst step, the details of the actor’s identity are recorded so as to know whether he was a
public or private one and the policy sector he is active in (agriculture, forestry, tourism, research,
urbanization, etc.).
The hierarchy analysis of the network was based on the concept of oligarchy. The fewer the
actors, which concentrate the power (pressure, trust), the higher the oligarchy becomes. The
hierarchies are practically depicted in the form of chain control relationships: if the actor A
gained actor’s B trust, B gained C’s trust and C gained D’s trust and so on, then A could
inﬂuence all: B, C and D, with just one call. Similar chains are formed in the case of pressure.
An actor being on the top of numerous and longest chains, he has the highest power status in
the network and he acquires the highest position in the hierarchy of the network. The previous
power chains are calculated by a speciﬁc algorithm, the Katz status formula (Formula 1):
T = aC + a2C2 + :::+ akCk (1)
where T is a matrix including the status values of all actors as elements, C is the matrix
presenting the real network (e.g. of trust links).
For that purpose a speciﬁc software (VISONE) is used, which visualizes this hierarchy, giving
it the shape of a pyramid (Fig. 2). In this way, the actors are examined as objects comparable
with each other and the networks can be clearly perceived as systems [23]. Thereby, the networks
become also comparable with each other, independent of the diﬀerent qualitative nature of the
policy issues they concern. The position (status) of each actor in the vertical Y-axis of the
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pyramid is measured as power share (%) the actor possesses. Actors that are found at the same
level in the pyramid hold the same percentage. The more actors at the lowest level are, the larger
is the bottom X of the pyramid, and, thus, a pyramid with a large base is shaped, which shows
the existence of a high oligarchy (the horizontal layout of the actors at the various levels of the
pyramid has nothing to do with their power).
Figure 2: Examples of environmental policy networks by VISONE
The oligarchy of every network was set as the diﬀerence between the maximum (max) and
the minimum (min) power value (status) that appeared in each network divided by the average
power of all actors of the network and it may vary from 0 till inﬁnity (Formula 2) [21]. Oligarchy
is a meta-data derived from power and it is not measured any more as % but as a pure number.
Thus, it is a mono-dimensional (single-number) indicator of the politico-administrative structure.
More precisely, the links of trust and the links of pressure are primary data. The power calculated
with Katz status formula is 1st class meta-data and the oligarchy which calculated using power
status is a 2nd class meta-data [27–30].
Oligarchy =
Status max  Status min
Status Average
(2)
Another variable is the density of the links (general contacts, conﬂicts, trust, pressure, ex-
change of general or scientiﬁc information). This variable becomes visually clear in the polygonal
form of the networks in Fig. 2. If every relation is regarded as a diagonal, then the density ex-
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presses the percentage of the existing diagonals divided by the total number of all possible
diagonals of the polygon (Formula 3). Thus, density is a 1st class meta-data based on the links
number (primary data) of a particular relation type (trust, conﬂicts etc). In fact, high density
practically means that every chance of cooperation (or conﬂict) within the network has been
explored and used at highest possible level.
Density of relation A = Number of links of relation A=(N2  N) (3)
where N is the number of actors participating in the network.
In general, Katz status and oligarchy provides insights about the real structure (formal and
informal) of the network, about the power concentration and thereby about the coordination
potential, while the density is suitable for the diagnosis of the intensity of the activity and
the importance of each type of relation (general contacts, conﬂicts, trust, pressure, general or
scientiﬁc information) for the network cohesion as well as about the saturation of policy activity
(e.g. lobbying) within a network (Fig.3).
Figure 3: Data classiﬁcation
Apart from the general contacts that are detected, more specialized relations were measured
by means of the following questions:
- Trust:
To what extent would you let each of the following actors, with whom you came in contact
with, to make a decision on behalf of you or you would follow their suggestions without examin-
ing them critically? 1: there is no such possibility, 2: partly, 3: to the hilt
- Institutional pressure:
Tell us for each actor, that you came in contact with, whether he was irreplaceable for you,
because of a speciﬁc function he had, in the particular issue. 0: no, 1: yes
- General information:
Tell us from what actor you received information (of any kind). 0: if no information was
received, 1: if there is information ﬂow.
- Scientiﬁc information:
Name three actors from whom you received the most important scientiﬁc information. This
relation was scaled with 0 and 1, as in the case of the general information.
- Conﬂict:
Name the actors you were in conﬂict with. This was scaled with 0 and 1.
- Ambiguity of policy content:
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Tell us how often you needed interpretation of the laws and other rules concerning the par-
ticular issue, you were involved in, from a solicitor or other experts. 1: not at all, 2: sometimes,
3: very often. The average of the grades that the actors noted in a network showed the general
ambiguity of the policy content of network issue (Fig. 3).
- Interventionism:
It has been calculated as the inverse of the ambiguity. Since the ambiguity varies from 1 to
3, the legal interventionism varies respectively from 1 to 0,33. It just constitutes a subsidiary
indicator for technical-statistical reasons, which presents a signiﬁcant correlation with cross-
sectorality and is presented as an alternative indicator.
3 The Case study: Meta-Information of Functionality
3.1 Networks analysis
The 12 environmental policy networks are the following ones:
I) In Denmark a network of 18 "actors", concerning the certiﬁcation of sustainable manage-
ment of natural recourses was explored. This issue treated the enactment of speciﬁcations and
control processes about the management of natural resources, so that their production potential
will not be degraded. Network of the same issue (sustainability of natural resources) was opened
up in II) Finland (24 actors) and in (III) Spain (38 actors). IV) In Bavaria, a network of 14
actors was opened up, which was concerning "the eco-account", namely the evaluation and the
counterbalance of environmental consequences. V) Moreover, in Bavaria another network of 16
actors was opened up, which dealt with the mapping and description of forest biotopes. VI) In
Sweden, a network related to the protection of biotopes (11 actors) and one more VII) related
to the national forest policy (14 actors) were explored. VIII) In Greece, a network of 13 actors
concerning the Article 24 of the Constitution was opened up. IX) In Scotland, the network was
related to the forest policy (23 actors) and X) to the issue of the national park Loch Lomond and
Trossachs (27 actors). XI) In Ireland, a network related to the provisional marketing services in
forestry was examined (25 actors) and XII) in Spain, a network concerning research on Castanea
genetics (21 actors) was analyzed.
All 12 networks involved 234 actors in total: 30% public agencies and 70% private actors.
According to their function they can be categorized as follows: a) 43% interest groups which
deal with the economic utilization of natural resources (unions of enterprises, forest industries
and landowners), b) 42% actors aiming at nature conservation (e.g. institutions of environmental
protection, environmental organizations), c) 6% individual enterprises (not unions of enterprises),
d) 9% scientiﬁc actors (universities, research centers). In all these issue networks forest policy
and rural development matters are strongly interconnected and are included in the wider ﬁeld of
the environmental policy discourse.
3.2 Consequences of ambiguity
Hypothesis 1
As the ambiguity increases, and the hierarchy (oligarchy) dissolves, and consequently the conﬂicts
increase, the networks not only do not dissolve but in contrast, the contacts between the actors
and the cross-sectorality increase.
In Table 1, there is a signiﬁcant positive correlation between ambiguity, density of conﬂicts
and density of general contacts. The cross-sectorality has a reciprocal relation with the legal
interventionism, so practically it could be assumed that it increases with the ambiguity [12,18,31].
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The more ambiguous the policy content is, the more disagreements appear about the obli-
gations and rights of the actors and about which measures or speciﬁcations should be further
institutionalized: Who will pay compensations for any restrictions imposed on natural resource
utilization? What authorizations should the interest groups have? Which "risk" should be
considered to be "acceptable"? etc. Such questions are steadily posed in case of ambiguous law-
making. Under these conditions, the probability of conﬂict becomes higher. The only antidote
would be a clear law. If the law is explicit enough from the beginning, it becomes clear who can
participate in the network, and what he is expected or allowed to do.
As mentioned above, the fact that the networks dissolve, when the conﬂicts increase, is fre-
quently supported. However, in Table 1, it is observed that apart from the conﬂicts that become
denser to ambiguity (0,168), the general contacts among the actors become much denser (0,557).
It is thus understandable that in truculent and uncertain political-administrative conditions, the
actors try to broaden their coalitions in order to outbalance the chances which are lost or new
threats created because of conﬂicts. Therefore, more and more opportunities of collaboration are
used and the network is sustained, despite the increasing conﬂicts. Thus, the software proves
that the policy networks have retroaction mechanisms.
In Table 1, it is also evident that the cross-sectorality is further developed, as the state
intervensionism (inverse of ambiguity) decreases (-0,132). Actors from many diﬀerent sectors
can interpret the abstract aims and restrictions of a policy content, in such a way that they seem
to be in accordance with their interests and capacities. An ambiguous law about the "protection
of mountain water resources" makes possible the involvement of a wide spectrum of actors: from
environmental organizations up to unions of construction ﬁrms, but also fresh water enterprises
or angling tourism business. Of course, this may cause a proliferation of conﬂicts but without
putting the network at risk.
In Table 1, the oligarchy decreases as the ambiguity increases (-0,441) (namely, the form
of the pyramid becomes unclear, see Fig. 1). The decrease of oligarchy gives a free scope to
conﬂicts because it is less evident who is going to win. Thus, anyone -even the weak ones- ﬁnd
the courage to risk a controversy. The dissolution of hierarchy is the result of the fact that it is
not clear who controls whom.
Table 1. Consequences of ambiguity in conﬂicts, in the density of general con-
tacts, in cross-sectorality and in oligarchy
Ambiguity
Density of conﬂict-relations Pearson Coeﬃcient .168
Level of signiﬁcance .010
Density of general contacts Pearson Coeﬃcient .557
Level of signiﬁcance .000
Oligarchy (oﬃcial and unoﬃcial hierarchies) Pearson Coeﬃcient -.441
Level of signiﬁcance .000
Interventionism
Cross-sectorality (number of involved political sectors) Pearson Coeﬃcient -.132
Level of signiﬁcance .043
Hypothesis 2
Under high ambiguity conditions (even if the general contacts get denser and there is high cross-
sectorality and uncertainty in the network, as supported in Hypothesis 1), the trust relations
proliferate, while the relations of pressure decrease.
The common belief is that under high ambiguity, the contacts proliferate in a network, and
consequently the trust is reduced, as the potential sources of diﬀerence and threats increase and
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it becomes more diﬃcult for a larger number of participants to become familiar enough with
each other and to build clear and well coordinated coalitions. However, as seen in Table 2, when
the ambiguity increases, the trust seems also to increase (0,242). Simultaneously, there seems to
be a minimization of the usage of pressure (-0,407). This happens because it is not clear when,
how and who can activate a regulative coercive tool. Therefore, trust becomes a more preferable
politico-administrative power form than pressure.
When some actors provide convincing interpretations, then they gain the trust of the rest
actors. Inversely, actors, who have already gained the trust of others, thanks to their mul-
tidisciplinary staﬀ and their stable and lawful behavior have better chances to present their
interpretations as more convincing [11,13,18,22,24,31].
Apart from that, in a network of high ambiguity a kind of "natural selection" also takes place;
from the very beginning the only actors who survive are rather the reliable actors. Thus, in such
a network it is more crucial for an actor to gain the trust of the others and satisfy his interest
than to try to exert pressure "in the name of" an ambiguous rule with unknown results. It could
be assumed that under conditions of high ambiguity, the anxiety derived from the uncertainty
of the interpretation surpasses the anxiety of a new coalition. For this reason, trust can be
developed.
Table 2. Consequences of ambiguity in the composition of power (trust and
institutional pressure)
Ambiguity
Density of trust relation Pearson Coeﬃcient .242
Level of signiﬁcance .000
Density of relations of pressure Pearson Coeﬃcient -.407
Level of signiﬁcance .000
Hypothesis 3
As the ambiguity increases, the use of scientiﬁc information increases, while the use of general
information is restricted.
As seen in Table 3, the ambiguity creates a "friendly" or even attractive environment for the
experts (lawyers, planers etc), since the need of using scientiﬁc information increases (0,250) at
the expense of general information (-0,329) which can be used by any lobbyist, even by those
who are not considered to be "specialized" in the particular policy issue. Because of the need of
actors to be adjustable to the steadily developing "new technologies" and to the socio-political
and economic changes, both expert ("scientiﬁc") knowledge on legal matters and non-legal rules
(e.g. norms of nature, technology, and marketing) is demanded. Therefore, the contribution of a
wide range of scientists (solicitors, archeologists, biologists etc) is indispensable, and information
which is regarded as "scientiﬁc" proliferates.
As the ambiguity increases, the use of general information (matters of organizing, politics
and administration) is reduced. In ambiguous issues, one expects from the scientists to play
more important and intensive role in comparison with the director of public relations and the
administration staﬀ. In contrast, administrative staﬀ can solve problems only by using formalized
procedures expressed through general information and not by developing "scientiﬁc" creativeness.
Table 3. Policy impacts of ambiguity in general and scientiﬁc information
Ambiguity
Density of scientiﬁc information Pearson Coeﬃcient .250
Level of signiﬁcance .000
Density of general information Pearson Coeﬃcient -.329
Level of signiﬁcance .000
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Hypothesis 4
When a policy measure is not a direct (regulative) instrument (threat of penalty) but an indirect
(economic or informational) instrument (motivating or convincing), then it is more ambiguous.
In Table 4, it is evident that the pressure from the public actors towards the private ones,
which is the basis for implementing regulative tools that necessitate clear rules, tends to decrease
under conditions of high ambiguity (-0,140). Ambiguity tends to appear in policy contents which
include indirect instruments. Example of indirect instrument is a law which encourages the use
of anti-pollution technology via the award of an ecological badge. The ambiguity of the indirect
instrument is derived from the wide range of possible interpretations concerning the forms of
"environment-friendly" attitude, the standards, the form, the procedure and the source of the
reward (e.g. environmental tax, compensation for restrictions on the exploitation of natural
resources, award of an ecological badge) and the procedure of performance assessment.
In Table 4, an increase of the number of contacts from the part of private actors towards the
public ones (chances of lobbying) is also observed (0,146) under conditions of high ambiguity.
This can be explained by the need of private actors to receive clear and reliable information
about the law implementation. Thus, ambiguity can become a basis for new obstacles but also
for new lobbying and collaborations but also between public and private actors.
Table 4. Consequences of ambiguity in the relations of public-private sector and
in the institutional pressure of public actors
Ambiguity
Number of relations of pressure exercised by public Pearson Coeﬃcient -.140
actors to private actors
Level of signiﬁcance .032
Average of general contacts from the private actors Pearson Coeﬃcient .146
towards the public ones
Level of signiﬁcance .026
4 Conclusion & Discussion
A software toolbox which is engineered for social network analysis can be useful for analyzing
policy issues and politico-administrative systems as multi-objective entities (diﬀerent types of
links, hierarchies and actors). It may be applicable in improving power status, policy implemen-
tation and lobbying as well as in policy e-learning systems for lobbyists and administrators (e.g.
using networks as role play scenarios). Such a software product is purposeful for detecting the
real hierarchies and activities (not only the formal but also the informal ones).
Basic points for software engineers and policy analysts are the following ones:
The visualization is especially useful for this purpose. The algorithm of Katz status seems
to be a useful tool, as it has been proven not only to be useful for visualizing hierarchy but also
to visualize political oligarchy, at least according to the deﬁnition employed in this paper. The
oligarchy indicates the potential of politico-administrative coordination. Apart from that, the
oligarchy concept which is based on the power calculation and the density of trust, pressure,
information and conﬂicts presented ﬁeld-related properties such as statistical correlation with
policy content ambiguity.
Another useful algorithm which presented properties interesting for policy-makers and policy
analysts is this of density of various types of links, which practically indicates intensity of activity.
As these properties are detected through statistical analysis, software designed for social network
analysis can become more eﬃcient, if it includes statistical functions, particularly tests, or if it
provides the possibility of exporting output data to statistical software or to convert them in other
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types of ﬁles which should be importable to statistical sheets. In any case, statistical analysis
can hardly be isolated from social network analysis, if useful properties of social network are
expected to be found. Therefore, social network analysis software should oﬀer combined functions
of Matrix Algebra and Statistics.
An additional technical advantage could be to oﬀer the possibility of appearance of each
type of links in diﬀerent color within the same network ﬁle. In this way, it would be possible
to visually distinguish trust from pressure links and to comparatively examine the hierarchy of
trust and this of pressure within the same pyramid. Similarly, a visual comparison of diﬀerent
densities (trust, scientiﬁc information, general information etc) would be possible.
Before starting primary data collection and meta-data deﬁnition, the software should be
integrated in theoretical frameworks of Policy Analysis and empirical research design. Without
a precise deﬁnition and measurement of each type of links (e.g. trust, pressure), the quantitative
metadata of such software toolbox will have no meaning for the policy ﬁeld they are applied to
and will not be convincing researchers and experts of empirical disciplines. Thus, a systematic
collaboration between software engineers, policy analysts and policy ﬁeld experts is necessary.
For this purpose, software engineers should maintain narrow contact to policy analysis discourse
and policy analysts should adopt more positivism.
Basic conclusions for policy-makers could be the following ones:
Although ambiguity increases the conﬂicts among the actors, it does not dissolve the network
but increase the cross-sectorality and it lets the contacts proliferate. Moreover, it prevents the
development of strict hierarchies based on pressure and favors the development of trust. In this
way, it may contribute to the development of more sustainable collaborations, as trust is eﬀective
even without surveillance. In contrast, the use of pressure does not seem to be eﬀective under
conditions of ambiguity. Using information which is regarded as "scientiﬁc" is also an eﬀective
strategy. Interest groups of forest and landowners etc should pay extra attention to this point
because they are normally characterized by restricted multidisciplinarity in comparison with
the environmental organizations and thus, they have a more restricted persuasion potential in
comparison with the environmentalists.
Actors involved in ambiguous issues must be especially well prepared for a lot of disagreements
and conﬂicts. The role of "peacemaker" can be adopted by anyone who can gain the trust of the
others and will not try to implement a forced "peace" that "suits" his interests through pressure.
The successful lobbying of a private actor to the public actors is of major importance in order to
assure access to explicit instructions. Ambiguous policy contents do not only cause diﬃculties
but can also provide opportunities of satisfying interests and building new coalitions. The need
for an apt and long-term lobbying becomes more imperative in the case of indirect (economic
and informational) instruments, which tend to be characterized by higher ambiguity than the
direct (regulative) instruments.
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